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A Criticism on “A Mathematician’s
Apology” by G. H. Hardy
“. . . modern science . . . has recognised the anthropomor-
phic origin and nature of human knowledge. . . . it has
recognised that man is the measure of all things, and that
there is no other measure.”
Tobias Dantzig
Among the greatest scientists in the world, there are many who consider
science, from an idealistic point of view, as an anonymous human achieve-
ment, hence, something that mankind should be proud of (contrasting by the
way, with many other shames of our species!). This is the point of view which
I want to adopt in this article: consider science in a classic and pure context,
independent of industrial technology or military motivations. Following this
idea, science is evolving naturally as a consequence of the curiosity of the
mind on finding out how things in the world around us work, and how they
behave: Is it possible that there are general laws? Are there some principles
governing the apparent chaos? Is it possible that the apple which falls is
part of the same natural phenomenon as the Moon which rotates around the
Earth but does not fall?
The search for such kind of answers is rather exciting for these intellects.
Two hundred years ago, Laplace explained this exploration in his impressive
The System of the World: “One of the strongest passions is the love of truth,
in a man of genius” [9, Book V, Chap. IV]. Real scientists do not compete
with each other: the challenge is rather to overcome the limitations and
ignorance of human beings. Inarguably, some scientific contributions carry
more weight than others. But, once scientists view their research as part of an
exhilarating scientific voyage, there is no room left for dichotomous attitudes,
classifying people as winners or losers. And here starts my criticism of the
well-known book of G. H. Hardy (1877-1947): “A Mathematician’s Apology”.
In this book, published for the first time in 1940, he gives his opinion on the
mathematical world in twenty-nine short chapters. More recent editions are
easier to find and include a foreword by C. P. Snow [5]. Along this article I
am going to point out some ideas presented in his book which sound to me
either controversial, having prejudice or could be argued in a more respectful
and deferential way.
Right from the start, he apologizes for his own criticism, claiming that:
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“exposition, criticism, appreciation, is work for second-rate minds.” It is
a rather surprising beginning (what does he imply about the author of the
Exposition du Systeˆme du Monde [9], the masterpiece mentioned above?)
We all know about very talented philosophers, critics, writers, artists, even
journalists who had been and are still playing a fundamental role in the
development of science, arts and humanism in general. So, this comment
sounds very pretentious coming from a mathematician.
Still in the first chapter he disdains the speech of Alfred E. Housman
(1859-1936), Kennedy Professor of Latin in the University of Cambridge, in
his Leslie Stephen lecture on the 9th of May 1933: The Name and Nature
of Poetry when, at the very beginning [6, p. 2] he modestly referred to his
previous speech years before in the same Senate-House:
“In these twenty-two years I have improved in some respects and
deteriorated in others, but I have not so much improved as to
become a literary critic, nor so much deteriorated as to fancy
that I have become one.”
He was reinforcing what he had said in 1911 in the Cambridge Inaugural
Lecture The Confines of Criticism, about literary criticism [7, p. 27]. Con-
cerning this quotation, Hardy declares: “. . . deplorable that a great scholar
and a fine poet should write like this.” I apologise for wishing to express
exactly the same words about Hardy’s declaration.
My disappointment arises specifically from the fact that the book was
written by such a great mathematician, who not only left many contributions
of his own, but also, the unique occidental mathematician who was consider-
ate enough to recognise the talent of Ramanujan. A quite unusual attitude
for that time: help and support bringing to light exceptionally talented peo-
ple who come from not so (scientifically) prestigious places. For those who
are interested in knowing more about the relation between Hardy and Ra-
manujan, see e.g. the Ranganathan’s book [11], where one finds details of
Ramanujan’s meteoric and short carrier, and his depressive and unhealthy
life.
Due to the atrocities of the First World War, Hardy had reasons to con-
demn the application of science in military matters, in particular, to repro-
bate the fact that some research on applied mathematics was supporting
directly those purposes. Needless to say that applied mathematics is much
wider than those military purposes (by the way Bertrand Russell knew that,
and focused his pacifism in a more directed way, up to the point of being
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imprisoned for pacifist acts during the war). For some reason related to
this, Hardy was very proud for being a pure mathematician (“a real math-
ematician . . . the purest of the pure” as C. P. Snow described in the Fore-
word), I would say, almost to the point of treating applied mathematics with
prejudice. Nevertheless, ironically, contrasting with this stereotype, he also
became famous due to a beautiful result on applied mathematics. In 1908
he sent a 2-page letter to the editor of the Science [4] with results (con-
currently with the German physician W. Weinberg) on how proportions of
dominant and recessive genetic traits propagate in a large mixed population,
the well-known Hardy-Weinberg law. This result became centrally impor-
tant in many population genetic problems including hemolytic disease, see
e.g., among many others introductory textbooks on the subject, Spiess [12].
Concerning Hardy’s outstanding legacy on pure mathematics, his contribu-
tions are mainly on theory of Diophantine analysis, divergent series, Fourier
series, Riemann zeta-function and the distributions of primes. His greatest
collaborators were Littlewood and Ramanujan.
Back to the book which is the focus of my criticism, in Chapter seven
he describes his ideas on motivation for scientific research. He emphasizes
some motives which go, in some sense, against those ideas I presented in
the first two paragraphs. He claims that, besides intellectual curiosity, the
inspirations come from professional pride, “ambition, desire for reputation,
and the position, even the power or the money, which it brings”. I agree that
these latter points represent part of motivation for many among us. But
definitely they also represent delicate points which, when overcharged can
induce acts which hurt (or could be in the borderline of) ethic. Regrettably,
he emphasizes the last few motives:
“So if a mathematician, or a chemist, or even a physiologist, were
to tell me that the driving force in his work had been the desire
to benefit humanity, then I should not believe him (nor should I
think the better of him if I did)”.
This phrase could sound as an offence for those working on science for
idealism or for those really working for “love of truth” or to “benefit the
humanity”, and we know that these people, though the minority, do exist!
These e´litist or competitive ideas, in the sense that the only contributions
which matter are made by those among the best, is pejoratively reinforced
along the book. They are expressed in words like: “mathematical fame . . .
one of the soundest and steadiest investment” (Chap. 8) ,“second-rate mind”
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or “. . . have done something beyond the powers of the vast majority of men”
(Chap. 6).
Philosophically speaking, I think nowadays it is hard to find somebody
who agrees with his statement in Chapter 27 concerning a phrase of Hogben:
“The mathematics which can be used ‘for ordinary purposes by ordinary
men’ is negligible.” Firstly, on what concerns the e´litist aspect of this dis-
dainful phrase, compare it with the Preface of The Mathematics of Great
Amateurs [1], where Coolidge says that, in his book: “. . . the number of
men included could easily be doubled or trebled”. Secondly, on what con-
cerns the presumptuous aspect of Hardy’s phrase, contrast it with the modest
and respectful declaration of Laplace, as simple and deep as that [9, Book
V, Chap.1] :
“. . . l’inge´nieuse me´thode d’exprimer tous les nombres avec dix
caracte`res, en leur donnant a` la fois, une valeur absolue et une
valeur de position; ide´e fine et importante, qui nous paraˆıt main-
tenant si simple, que nous en sentons a` peine, le me´rite.” 1
This quotation of Laplace opens the second chapter of the remarkable
book Number: the Language of Science by Tobias Dantzig [2], author of the
epigraph at the top of this article. His book received many compliments
of 20th century top scholars, including Albert Einstein. Many other authors
also contrast with Hardy’s idea. Besides the already mentioned Laplace book
[9], it is hard to prevent to mention the excellent work of some other illus-
trious authors (I apologise in advance for omitting so many of them in this
short article) like Morris Kline, in particular his comprehensive survey Math-
ematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times [8], Lancelot T. Hogben
(who, in Chapter 27 and 28 Hardy makes clear that he belongs to a different
school from his own), some contemporaries like David Fowler, Carl Boyer, or
Ian Stewart with his vast work involving updated mathematical objects. It
is equally interesting to note some introductory texts regarding philosophy
of science in general, like (back to the 17th century) the classic “dialogue”
written by the founder of the modern physics Galileo Galilei [3], some of H.
Poincare´’s works ([10], e.g.) and the more philosophical works of Bertrand
Russel and Raymond Wilder. As we said before, many of these books go in
an opposite direction of the ideas presented by Hardy.
1“. . . the ingenious method of expressing all numbers by means of ten symbols, each
symbol receiving a value of position as well as an absolute value; a profound and important
idea which appears so simple to us now that we ignore its true merit.”
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We all know that there are many books on history and philosophy of
mathematics which are partial, elitists or even tendentious in many aspects.
But what really surprises me is the gap between Hardy’s attitude in his
life and the ideas expressed in his book. Naturally, people develop different
concepts, sensitiveness and points of view along their intellectual carrier.
Nevertheless, Hardy’s book, compared to others, humanistically speaking,
reflects a very dry, bitter and thorny philosophy.
Finally, for those who are interested in getting to know more about the
kind of “irony” Hardy enjoyed, have a look in the note by A. M. Vershik
[13]. Without wanting to dislodge Hardy’s book from its established status
as a statement on mathematical philosophy by a thoughtful and articulate
mathematician, I recommend that in reading it we ask ourselves whether
some of the ideas presented are presumptuous and scornful to the point of
hurting the development of science and humanism in general.
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